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China’s partnership with African countries is under scrutiny with many people increasingly 
worried by their willingness to give out loans regardless of whether a country would be 
able to pay back the loans. Critics are accusing China of using debt-trap diplomacy to take 
out resources by offering cheap loans without conditions. China claims that it has no 
interest in interfering in the internal affairs of its African partners, unlike its Western 
counterparts. For the U.S, its influence in Africa has decreased and it is increasingly 
worried by China’s global ambitions. The current U.S administration has been warning 
African countries to reject China’s loans and encouraged them to stick with the U.S as a 
more important partner. African leaders, however, still see China as a better partner as 
many of them can point to the infrastructure built by Chinese funding. 
 
This research paper aims to explore the partnerships between China, the United States 
and sub-Saharan Africa specifically. The aim is to see who is a better trading partner for 
sub-Saharan Africa, and to explore the reasons why a majority of African countries prefer 
Chinese loans over traditional lenders from the West, such as the IMF and World Bank.  
 
For African leaders, China simply represents a better partner because it is funding big 
infrastructure projects that meet the demand for infrastructure in Africa. Nobody is 
convinced that China or the U.S are in Africa for altruistic reasons and African leaders are 
well aware that China is also there for its own interests but to them it is important that a 
trading partner respects the sovereignty of a country and does not try to impose its own 
beliefs as many western countries have long been accused of doing.    
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1 Introduction 
Both China and the U.S.A are two important strategic trading partners for sub-Saharan 
Africa. They both represent and invest in Africa differently and both of their 
relationships with Africa have divided opinions amongst people in Africa and outside. 
More recently, especially in the last couple of decades, China has been more 
aggressively doing business in Africa compared to the United States, which has cut 
back on its investments over the last decade. The Trump administration has a new 
strategy for Africa that looks to increase investment in Africa and curb China’s growing 
influence but there are little signs so far that shows that the current U.S administration 
sees Africa as an important trading partner as President Trump has so far made no 
effort to visit Africa. The relationship between Western countries and African nations 
has never been fair and for many African leaders, China offers a better alternative to 
that offered by the Western countries.  
 
Nevertheless, while it is true that there is no colonial history between China and Africa, 
many people are increasingly worried by China’s engagement in Africa and are calling 
it neo-colonialism. The open-door policy has come under scrutiny as many critics point 
at the way China easily gives out loans to African countries, with many believing that 
this is a debt trap diplomacy designed to take out resources from Africa. For this 
reason it has a long-term negative implication for the continent. Western countries like 
the U.S have long been accused of using financial institutions like the IMF and the 
World Bank to advance their own ambitions by offering cheap short-term loans that 
come with a lot of conditionalities that allow Western corporations to come into 
developing countries and dominate markets. It is believed that this is one of the driving 
factors that leads to African governments to choose China’s loans over those of the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
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2 China, United States and sub-Saharan Africa trade overview 
2.1 China and USA trade overview 
In 1978, China made a dramatic decision to reform its economy to a more market-
oriented economy. The reform was based on China opening its doors to international 
trade and global investments. After the economic reform, China saw a large influx of 
foreign investment in the country and access to global markets made China an instant 
success story. China officially became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in December 2001. This move was highly encouraged by other WTO members 
because they also saw China as a big trading opportunity to be realised. China’s rise to 
a world economic superpower is nothing short of remarkable and today China is the 
second largest economy after The United States of America. 
Trade between China and USA has rapidly increased over recent decades. With China 
becoming the world leader on the industrial economy scale (Yang, 2019) and the 
United States having a huge consumer buying power, it is no surprise that today these 
two powerful countries have become each other’s biggest trading partners. In 2018, the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2018) estimated that China’s economic output 
amounted to around $25,3 trillion, which is about 19% of the world’s total gross 
domestic product (Amadeo, 2019). The United States is third, after the European 
Union, with an output of an estimated $20,5 trillion. Consequently, these numbers 
demonstrate the sheer power the two countries hold in the global economy.  
The two nations have a complicated relationship that has not always seen them see 
eye to eye. Today the U.S. is accusing China of engaging in unfair trade practices that 
it now claims has resulted in a trade deficit of $378.6 billion in goods and services in 
2018 (USTR, 2018). The United States argues that China is not protecting United 
States businesses’ interests through limiting their access to Chinese market and theft 
of their intellectual property. They also argue that China is not doing enough to buy 
American goods. The sentiment coming from China is that the U.S. harbours jealousy 
towards China’s increasing power and the motive behind the trade dispute is to curb 
the growth of China’s rise as the biggest world economic powerhouse.  
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2.1.1 Trade accusations 
According to the WTO Intellectual Property Rights agreement (IPR), all member states 
are required to adhere to the IPR agreement, meaning that member state governments 
must enforce these rights to prevent violation of these rights in order to protect owners 
of intellectual properties. IP owners must be granted rights through a fair and equitable 
process that must be simple, not costly and without unwarranted delays. Stealing of IP 
theft must be treated as a criminal offence. Regarding technology transfer, developing 
countries are required to promote incentives for their companies to promote the 
transfer of technology to developing countries in order to enable them to crease a 
sound and viable technology base (WTO | Understanding the WTO - Intellectual 
property: protection and enforcement, 2020). 
China has been heavily criticised for, as some say, extorting the market. This is done 
through different mechanisms that have over the decades been perfected to China’s 
advantage. China’s successful economy largely depends on its ability to export more 
products than any other country in the world. The more China sells to the rest of the 
world, the more money is brought to the Chinese economy. This strategy is made 
possible by different methods. One of these is by giving incentives to Chinese 
companies to export more, which is done by providing subsidies to local companies or 
in some cases by giving them tax breaks and cheap loans from Chinese banks. (Lee, 
2020). 
China has been accused countless times of intellectual property theft. It is alleged that 
the transfer of intellectual property is made possible because China has some laws that 
may require foreign companies to partner up with Chinese companies if they wanted to 
do business in certain sectors (as shown by examples in Figure 1 below), which means 
that a foreign company might have to share information with their partners, including 
the technical knowhow of technologies. The Chinese government has strongly denied 
that there are such laws in China that force any foreign company to transfer any 
technology to their partners, and that transfer of technologies are a consequence of 
contract negotiations between a Chinese Company and a foreign one. According to Li 
Yong, deputy director of the China Association of International Trade Expert 
Committee, WTO members do have the right to relax or limit market access, adding 
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that this was included in each country’s commitments to the WTO (Haitao, Ke, Zhiming 
and Chaoyi, 2018). 
2.1.2 United States intellectual property theft accusations against China 
In 2017, the Office of the U.S Trade Representative (USTR, 2018) carried out an 
investigation into China’s alleged unfair trade practices of technology transfers and 
infringement of intellectual property rights. The investigation was completed on March 
22, 2018 and the report concludes that China is still engaging in unfair practices and 
that they have not made much progress in changing policies or enforcing international 
trade rules, which subsequently led to the U.S government imposing tariffs on Chinese 
goods worth around $250 billion (USTR Releases Updated Section 301 Report on 
China’s Policies and Practices Concerning Technology Transfers and Intellectual 
Property Rights | Trump and Trade, 2018). 
Some findings include; 
• China may use indirect and informal ways to implement the transfer of 
technologies. Instead of having written instructions, they can use verbal 
instructions and requests, which makes it even more difficult to prosecute. In 
addition, U.S and other foreign companies are said to be scared to come 
forward and report unfair practices because they fear retaliation from the 
Chinese government. The Chinese market is extremely important to U.S 
companies and the risk is not worth it (USTR, 2018). 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF 
• Government initiated outbound investment strategy. A strategy that encourages 
Chinese companies, with many of them being state owned, to make investment 
in foreign countries like the U.S. The idea is to buy high tech companies in 
order to have access to U.S technologies in important industries (USTR, 2018). 
• China is not doing enough to stop cyber theft, which leads to the acquisition of 
important information such as trade secrets or confidential business information 
(USTR, 2018). 
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• Discrimination on issuing patent rights to foreign companies as a way of making 
it easier for Chinese Companies to use U.S companies’ technologies (USTR, 
2018). 
Subsequently, in 2018, the United States requested consultation with China at the 
WTO to address these unfair trade practices. 
 
 
Figure 1 Partnership requirements examples (USTR, 2018). 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF 
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2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa trade 
Sub Saharan-Africa is a region of the African continent consisting of 1.08 billion people 
(UN Development Program, 2020). According to IMF data for April 2020, sub-Saharan 
Africa’s Real Gross Domestic Product growth projections show that the region has 
declined by -1.6 during the preceding year. The decline is attributed to the current 
Covid19 pandemic situation that the whole world is going through. Sub-Saharan 
African countries stand to lose a lot of money through the collapse of tourism. 
Additionally, governments might have to spend more money to combat the pandemic 
as meanwhile exports are being affected negatively (Madden, 2020). However, 
projections show that the region is expected to grow by 3.8% next year 2021. Some of 
the best performing economies in 2020 include South Sudan that had a 4.1% growth 
rate, Uganda at 3.5%, Rwanda at 3.5%, Ethiopia at 3.2% as well as Benin and Senegal 
which saw 4.5% and 3% respectively. The bigger economies in sub-Saharan Africa like 
Nigeria, South Africa and Angola saw a negative growth that stood at -3.4%, -5.8% and 
-1.4% respectively. However, all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to 
have growth in 2021. External government debt to GDP stood at 55.93% with countries 
like Angola, Republic of Congo, Cabo Verde, Eritrea and Angola having more than 
100% debt to GDP. The region’s government debt is projected to grow by about 2% 
next year, which is a slight improvement from 2019 (IMF, 2020).  
 
With many developed countries experiencing a decline in birth rates, sub Saharan-
Africa is estimated to have the biggest growing population in any region in the world. It 
is important to note why this subject of a young generation is important. In young 
people the region has an opportunity to invest in its population and reap the rewards in 
the future, as young people are innovative and full of ideas. Africa needs new ideas 
and direction that can trigger an economic freedom that the population desperately 
needs, especially young people who are eager to see the continent succeed. Having a 
larger and younger population is an indication that the region will have a bigger 
consumer base and a bigger workforce. 
 
Africa is a continent rich in natural resources: from oil, diamond, gold, platinum, 
uranium, the continent is particularly rich. According to the World Bank, Nigeria is sub-
Saharan Africa’s biggest economy with a GDP of $397 billion, with South Africa, being 
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surpassed by Nigeria recently coming second with an economy value of $366 billion 
(Whiting, 2019). 
In terms of trade, Africa is not united, in fact, only 17% of trade happens internally and 
the rest externally. As a result of low intra-continental trade, a lot of revenue is lost and 
many opportunities to develop the continent go unrealised. A lack of transport links 
between African countries compounds the problem: roads, railway, airports and 
seaports must be improved. Africa mostly exports raw materials and other semi-
finished goods; the continent is looking to export more finished goods with value 
addition in order to gain more revenue. 
2.2.1 Role of the African Union 
The African union (AU) is a continental body consisting of the 55 member states that 
make up the countries of the African continent. The AU was officially launched in 2002 
as a successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was originally formed 
in 1963. The union draws inspiration from the European Union and hopes to replicate 
the blueprint to bring about peace, unity and economic stability on the continent. When 
the OAU was originally formed in 1963, its main objectives were to fight colonial and 
apartheid powers, to bring unity amongst Africans and to play a bigger role in the global 
economy. As time went by, the Union largely remained stagnant and it was reformed in 
order to deal with new challenges. 
The aims of the AU are as follows (About the African Union | African Union, 2020): 
• Achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the people 
• Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member 
States; 
• Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
• Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the 
continent and its peoples; 
• Encourage international cooperation 
• Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; 
• Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance; 
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• Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights 
instruments; 
• Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful 
role in the global economy and in international negotiations; 
• Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as 
well as the integration of African economies; 
• Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards 
of African peoples; 
• Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future 
Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of 
the Union; 
• Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in 
particular in science and technology 
• Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable 
diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent. 
• Ensure the effective participation of women in decision-making, particularly in 
the political, economic and socio-cultural areas; 
• Develop and promote common policies on trade, defence and foreign relations 
to ensure the defence of the Continent and the strengthening of its negotiating 
positions; 
• Invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an 
important part of our Continent, in the building of the African Union. 
 
2.2.2 African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) 
Hailed as the saviour of African economic problems, the African Continental Free 
Trade Agreement was launched by the AU in 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda and it is set to be 
the biggest free trading zone with 55 countries set to sign the agreement (Manders, 
2019). In comparison, the European Union, the second largest union, has 27 countries. 
AfCFTA is hoping to combine all 55 countries to create one single market with a 
population of 1.2 billion people and a combined GDP of $2.5 trillion. It is projected to 
boost intra-continental trade by eliminating tariffs, encouraging growth of local 
businesses, speeding up industrialization and creating jobs. Member countries will be 
required to reduce tariffs on good to as much as 90%, which will see an increase of 
9 
  
about 52% intra trading on the continent in a couple of years. A lot of people in Africa 
find it much easier to buy things from other countries outside Africa. For many people, 
buying goods from China is better; not only is it cheaper but it is less of a hassle 
(Ighobor, 2018). The agreement will take time before results can be seen, as it is 
estimated that it can take up to 10 years as there are a lot of obstacles to overcome but 
many leaders in Africa are optimistic and believe that such an agreement was 
inevitable. Unfortunately, because of the Covid19 global pandemic, the agreement has 
been postponed from coming into effect as previously agreed for July 1, 2020 (Olisah, 
2020). Currently there is no date set when it will come into effect as governments all 
over the world fight to contain the Covid19 virus.    
 
3 China and sub-Saharan trade 
3.1 Overview 
Many people across the globe, especially Western media and governments, and some 
Africans, regard Africa as becoming a victim of China’s global ambitions rather than its 
equal trading partner. China’s partnership with Africa is a highly polarised topic and it 
will remain to be so for as long as its influence on the continent remains high. Still, 
China and Africa continue to work together to improve their partnership that aims to 
benefit both parties instead of one as most currently see. There is a good argument to 
be made by critics who say that this partnership is dangerous for Africa and in the long 
run, it is designed to be a trap that benefits China the most. Some even go as far as 
saying this is neo-colonialism.  
 
These days many would agree that China is Africa’s biggest ally, not because it is 
Africa’s biggest trading partner but because it has an open-door policy for Africa. 
However controversial its partnership with Africa is, some believe China is the lesser 
evil of the superpowers of this world when comparing it to more traditional African 
trading partners like the United States or the Europeans. Since 2005, China has 
invested over $600 billion in Africa, with most of that money being invested in 
infrastructure, energy services and extraction of minerals. China also became Africa’s 
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biggest lender and China’s policy of no political and economic preconditions on loans 
has made its loans more favourable compared to the more traditional institutes like the 
IMF and World Bank, which have for a long time now been accused of being puppets 
for Western neoliberal global ambitions. While the United States has changed its 
strategy on how to do business in Africa, for China there is no plan to reduce its 
commitment to the continent and China continues to see Africa as worth the 
investment. In 2018, at the China-Africa summit held in Beijing, China, president Xi 
Jinping further promised that China will commit another $60 billion in financial support 
to African countries, with no strings attached (Sow, 2018).  
 
China’s willingness to offer loans to struggling countries is something that many are 
suspicious of because some of these countries won’t be able to pay the loans back. 
Instead, perhaps what they must give to China in case of such a scenario may be 
something much more worth than the original loan’s value. This suspicion is not 
unfounded as there have been cases where countries had to give up valuable assets 
used as collateral. In 2015, Sri Lanka gave up its port and 15 000 acres of land for 99 
years to China because it was not able to pay back loans (Abi-Habib, 2018). But on the 
other side of the coin, many still see China as a better trading partner. China’s 
investments in infrastructure projects have been welcome because Africa largely lags 
other developing countries in infrastructure development. A lack of infrastructure makes 
it hard for Africans to do intra-continental trading as costs are high and access to 
services and goods is a problem. Africans also look at China as a partner that does not 
look to impose its beliefs on Africans and has no history of colonialism in the continent. 
African governments are largely allowed to attend to their own national affairs without 
being told how to do it by China. 
 
Still, China remains sub Saharan-Africa’s biggest trading partner, but this partnership 
has been experiencing some problems lately with China changing its investment 
strategies. More recently, China has been concentrating more on domestic 
consumption to boost its own economy (Chen and Nord, 2018).  
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3.2 China’s investments in sub-Saharan Africa 
• Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC Investment) made the largest 
foreign investment in Africa by acquiring a 20% stake worth $5,6 billion in 
Standard Bank of South Africa in 2007 (Chen and Bosch, 2007). By investing a 
lot of money in Africa’s largest commercial bank, China is signifying its 
commitment to Africa and leading the way in showing confidence in the 
continent when others have been cutting back on their investments. China’s 
investment in Standard Bank encourages more trade between Africa and 
China. 
  
“We think it (the ICBC investment) is an enormous vote of confidence in South 
Africa and in Africa,” Standard Bank Chief Executive Officer Jacko Maree said 
at a presentation on the transaction in Johannesburg. The deal will give 
Standard Bank access to the world’s fastest-growing economy, further enhance 
its capital base and boost the bank’s ability to facilitate and finance trade flows 
between Africa and Asia, Maree said (Chen and Bosch, 2007).  
• In 2018, China and Ghana struck a deal that would see China release a $ 2 
billion funding package to be used for road construction projects across Ghana. 
In exchange, China gains access to 5% of Ghana’s bauxite (source of 
aluminium). The construction of these projects will be undertaken by a Chinese 
construction company. Another 100 vehicles for the Ghanaian police service 
were included in the deal as well as a $42.7 million grant and a $40 million debt 
write off (Smith, 2019). 
3.2.1 One Belt One Road initiative 
Deemed as China’s key to be the number one global force, the OBOR (One Belt One 
Road) project is the most ambitious initiative so far to cement China’s position as a 
global economic power. According to China’s leadership, this strategic initiative is going 
to reshape China’s global engagements. The project covers 3 continents: over 65 
countries have already signed up for the project and 20 of them are from Africa. The 
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project will strengthen China’s trade with other countries, in addition to economic 
incentives, political as well as military power.  
 
China’s One Belt One Road initiative is going to have a positive impact on sub 
Saharan-Africa, as it is promoting development in many countries in the region. It will 
strengthen China’s influence in Africa, not only economically but also politically. The 
initiative will have a positive effect on key sectors such as: energy and power, 
infrastructure projects, public utilities, construction, transport and logistics (Dong, Davis 
and Yu, 2018).  
 
One of the biggest projects to come from the OBOR initiative is the railway in Kenya, 
which stretches from Nairobi (capital city) to Mombasa. In 2017, the railway was 
opened, to the benefit of many Kenyan citizens as travelling time was cut short and 
people could now travel in comfort. Instead of a 12 hours bus drive, the distance is now 
4-6 hours shorter (Greg Mills, Emily van Der Merwe 2019). It also meant that more 
goods could travel between the two cities as trains generally can carry more containers 
compared to trucks. Neighbouring countries could also use the new railway system to 
their advantage. The railway was funded through a $3,2 billion loan acquired from 
China’s EXIM bank (Edwin Okoth, 2020).  
 
3.2.2 Case against China’s role in Africa 
For China, Africa is an important strategic partner for various reasons. All of China’s 
investment projects in Africa have a huge advantage for China, and a case can be 
made that China stands to win much more out of these than Africa. Africa is a massive 
user of Chinese industrial commodities, and imports of these commodities have 
increased for the use of One Belt One Road projects on the continent. When the 
Nairobi-Mombasa railway was being built, China’s export of cement to Kenya increased 
by 10 times, and the cement was then used to build the railway. The cement was not 
the only export; Chinese labour was also used, and this is not unusual, as it is common 
that China brings its own labour when working on projects like these in Africa. 
According to data, as of 2018, there were about 200 000 Chinese workers employed 
across Africa on various projects (National Bureau of Statistics Of China, 2020). In the 
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case of East Africa, the excess supply of cement and other industrial commodities such 
as steel, coal, aluminium etc. in the region creates big problems for the economies of 
those countries. For example, Kenya’s export of cement in the region dropped by 40% 
as a result of Chinese cement flooding the market (Nantulya, 2020)). Furthermore, 
some of these big infrastructure projects not only cost a lot to finance them but 
countries get loans from China and these loans create uncontrollable debt. Projects 
such as the Kenyan Nairobi-Mombasa railway are failing to stimulate any new 
economic activities and are also proving to be expensive to maintain (Misheck Mutize, 
2020). 
 
Figure 2 (Chinese workers in Africa (National Bureau of Statistics Of China, 2020) 
 
3.3 Good loans or debt trap? 
African states need money to develop infrastructure and boost their economies. 
Because of low economic growth caused by the financial crisis of 2008, many African 
governments have had to borrow more money to fill the gap. Over the last two 
decades, Chinese loans to sub-Saharan African countries went from $1 billion in 2001 
annually to $10 billion annually in 2017. Angola has the most debt owed to China in the 
region with loans totalling $42,8 billion in the last few decades. Consequentially, this 
has led to a few countries such as Angola, Zambia, Ghana and Nigeria paying 20% of 
their revenues to finance debt from China.  It is also important to note that as the 
country with the highest debt owed to China, Angola is the largest supplier of crude oil 
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to China in Africa and 4th largest in the world (Workman, 2020). Countries with natural 
resources such as Angola often use their resources as collateral in case they are 
unable to finance their debts with cash. With Angola paying back debt by way of 
sending oil to China, it leaves the country with little oil to sell in the market and this 
leaves the country with little revenue coming back in. In 2004, China’s state-owned oil 
company Sinonpec acquired a 55% stake in Angola’s state-owned oil company 
Sonangol called Sinope Sonangol International (Jenkins, 2019). Over the last decades 
it has made further investments in oil fields in Angola, and as well as acquiring other 
natural resources in mining industries. 
For many Africans, China’s engagement in the continent is becoming eerie and distrust 
is on the rise. More people are becoming wary of China’s willingness to give soft loans 
to African governments. The amount of loans that are being given out to governments 
is being questioned and some even wonder if African governments fully understand 
what they are getting themselves into. The terms and conditions of these loans are not 
always clear, and China has been accused of lacking transparency with regard to these 
agreements. For many people these loans are increasingly becoming too much and 
they are wary of how these loans will be paid back in the future. One of the arguments 
against China’s soft loans to Africa is China’s willingness to turn a blind eye on 
corruption and dictatorship in Africa. In 2019, Transparency International’s annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index listed sub-Saharan Africa as one of the most corrupt 
regions in the world (Transparency International, 2020).  
For China to keep giving loans to some of the most corrupt governments is a cause for 
concern. A corrupt government is one that is known for misusing public funds. The 
loans are not always used to provide goods and services to people. The loans are 
mismanaged and sometimes are used to finance big projects that do not necessary 
translate into economic growth. In the end most of these countries must go back and 
get new loans in order to finance repayments on old loans. This is not a sustainable 
practice; more debts mean that countries must keep spending the majority of their 
revenues to finance old debts. For instance, Nigeria spends close to 60% of 
government revenue to finance debt, with 20% of that going to China alone (Goldsmith, 
2019). This means that the money that could have been used to finance projects and 
offer goods and services to the people is now being used to pay off interest on debts. It 
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creates dependence on foreign loans, and it may eventually lead to an economic 
collapse. 
For many African leaders, however, China is a much better friend compared to their 
Western counterparts. This sentiment was repeated by the President of Rwanda and 
African Union chairperson when he praised China’s aid and investment policies in 
Africa as a source of deep transformation. He claims Western critics are more 
interested in disrupting Africa’s relationship with China. These words were openly said 
during the 2018 Africa-China summit held in Beijing. As the chairperson of the African 
Union his words represent the Union. Many African leaders are quick to dismiss 
criticism from the West, insisting that Africans know the conditions of their partnerships 
with China and nations must take personal responsibility to use loans wisely to deliver 
services to their population, to invest in projects that are able recuperate some money 
that can go back to repaying loans. If they are unable to pay back loans, then they 
must take blame.  Another African leader, Cyril Ramaphosa, president of South Africa, 
states that Africa refuses to accept the views from outsiders that China is colonising 
Africa (Taddele Maru, 2019). 
3.3.1 Zambia’s partnership with China 
Zambia is a country with a population of roughly 16.5 million people, it is situated in 
Southern Africa. A land locked country bordering Tanzania, Namibia, Malawi, 
Botswana, Angola, DRC and Zimbabwe. It is a country rich in natural resources like 
gold, silver, copper, cobalt, coal, Uranium and has one of the largest emerald mines in 
the world (Mwamba, 2018).  Shortly after gaining independence from Great Britain in 
1964, Zambia nationalised the mining sector for the government to get more revenue. 
At some point, revenue the government got from the mining sector made up 58% of 
state income. Nationalising the mining sector had a positive impact and Zambia’s 
economy was relatively successful and was even considered a middle-income country 
and had a great level of gross domestic product. Things went from good to bad 
following the collapse of copper prices in 1974 combined with the oil shocks of 1973 
and 1979. Zambia’s economy collapsed and it never managed to recover. As a result 
of Zambia’s economic downturn, the country has been heavily dependent on borrowed 
money ever since. First it was from traditional lenders like IMF and World Bank; also, 
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important to note that it was the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs that resulted in 
Zambia privatising its mining sector again. Since then, the mining sector has been in 
the hands of foreign corporations. The Copper mines have been controlled by 7 foreign 
corporations to date as shown in Figure 3 below (Schoneveld, German and Gumbo, 
2014). Currently China has become Zambia’s biggest lender and the third largest 
destination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China.  
Over the last two decades, most of Zambia’s biggest projects have been funded by 
China. These include football stadiums, a conference centre, housing complexes, 
police station services and a hydropower plant. While it is true that projects like these 
are important (though not always) and necessary as they can create employment for 
the locals and stimulate economies (Ofstad and Tjønneland, 2019), many of them do 
not generate any income that can be used to pay back loans. Furthermore, many of the 
project tenders were given to Chinese contractors, and as with the case of the Kenyan 
railway, Chinese companies tend to bring their own labour as many companies have 
claimed that often locals do not possess the skills to work on these projects. 
Furthermore, they bring their own materials and machinery as a way of protecting their 
own interests as well. Even though China claims that its loans do not come with 
political conditions, there is a strong belief that they do come with other conditions such 
as using Chinese labour and materials. This is a big problem, not only in Zambia but in 
other sub-Saharan African countries. Loans must be paid back, and many times with 
interest, but now the money from loans is also used to pay Chinese companies. In the 
end the money comes from China and goes straight to Chinese companies, some of 
which are even Chinese state-owned companies. 
Zambia is the 3rd biggest destination of China’s FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. China has 
stepped in to help fund Zambia’s biggest projects where the IMF and World Bank are 
unable to. As of 2018, Zambia’s external debt amounted to about $9,7 billion, and out 
of that, $3,1 billion was owed to China (Mfula, 2018). But this partnership is not all 
sunshine, and in recent years the relationship between the two countries has become 
increasingly worrying. As a result of growing debt to China, news started circulating 
that China was going to take over Zambia’s state-owned power supplier and utility 
company, Zesco, as a way of collecting debt. This news was further spread from U.S 
when during the unveiling of the Trump administration’s new strategy for Africa, White 
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House National Security Advisor, John Bolton, made a claim that Zambia owes China 
$6-10 billion and that China was about to take over the state company Zesco. He 
claimed that China’s practices in Africa are of a corrupt and predatory nature (The 
White House, 2018).  However, this claim was quickly dismissed by Zambia’s 
presidential spokesman Amos Chanda. He made it clear that Zesco was never on the 
table to be used as collateral (Mfula, 2018). Nevertheless, the rumours of Zambia’s 
state assets being taken over by China have never really gone away and the 
uncertainty and lack of transparency of the dealings between the two countries will 
keep such talk alive.   
 
 
Figure 3 Foreign controlled copper mines (Schoneveld, German and Gumbo, 2014) 
 
3.4 Why African governments prefer Chinese loans over IMF or World bank 
The World bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are both financial institutes that 
provide loans for developmental purposes. They pride themselves in fighting 
corruption, modernising economies and providing sustainable alternatives. They are 
similar in many respects and are often described as sister institutes; the difference is 
that the IMF provides short term loans to struggling countries, especially those that are 
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experiencing currency problems. Usually these countries find themselves having a hard 
time paying back other loans or unable to pay for imports. The IMF’s job is to help 
those struggling countries to stabilise their economies and operate in a sustainable 
manner through what it calls economic surveillance (IMF Annual Report 2019). The 
World Bank provides long term loans for developmental projects, usually with the 
purpose of reducing poverty. Both financial institutes are used as a last resort for 
countries in desperate situations and the loans have very low interest rates and 
sometimes no interest rates at all to low income earning countries. The IMF’s 
headquarters are situated in Washington DC, United States of America. There are 189 
member countries belonging to the institution. There are 24 people on the executive 
board that all represent member countries or a group of countries. Voting power is 
given based on who contributes the most. The more a country contributes financially, 
the more voting power it has. 
On the IMF official website, it is stated that borrowing countries must agree to adjust 
their economic policies that led to them needing to borrow money. Basically, when a 
government makes a loan agreement, the IMF brings its own conditions that are meant 
to help the borrowing country to recover from the economic situation that made it need 
to borrow money from the IMF and ensure the borrowing country pays back the loan 
(IMF Conditionality, 2020).  These conditions are called Structural Adjustment 
Programs or simply SAP. Some of these programs include control of government 
expenditures, privatization of state enterprises and deregulation of the economy, less 
restrictions on foreign investors ability to do business in the country. Reductions in 
restrictions means lowering taxes on imports and eliminating quotas for foreign firms, 
which evidently means less protection for local markets. A conditionality like 
privatisation of industries and services that are run by government, such as mining or 
fishing can mean that international corporations take over these sectors, as result of 
other conditionalities that promote liberalization of markets. If a foreign corporation 
takes over a mine, it means that natural resources leave the country, it means that 
more money leaves the country and it means there is less money for the government 
for its annual budget. And when things go bad, these corporations pack up and leave, 
leaving people unemployed. Devaluation of currencies is also encouraged to increase 
exports (Bello, 2006).  
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Figure 4: IMF funding distribution (IMF Annual Report 2019). 
3.4.1 The case against the IMF 
The IMF and the World bank have long been accused of being tools of Western 
corporations or interests. While they have some success stories in some countries 
where they have been able stabilise and modernise economies, for other countries, the 
conditionalities or SAPs of the IMF and World Bank are not favourable as they interfere 
with internal matters. After all the decades of African countries dealing with the IMF and 
World Bank, what progress can IMF pinpoint and say they have done better than 
China? African countries largely remain poor, even though a majority have had positive 
economic growth, but many of the problems like unemployment and high inequality 
remain, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. China, on the other hand, can point to 
infrastructure projects in construction and energy.  
As President Xi Jinping of China told African leaders at the Africa-China 2018 summit, 
the $60 billion investment that China has committed to Africa comes with no 
conditionalities (Sow, 2018). China claims that it has no interest in changing African 
ways of doing things, and it does not wish to impose anything on Africa, unlike the 
Westerners. The IMF on the other hand operates very differently; even though its loans 
may be cheap, they are not regarded as favourable because they can interfere with the 
political process, even where that is democratic. There is also the argument that most 
of the conditionalities that come with these loan packages are really designed to favour 
Western corporations. Requiring countries to devalue their currencies is inviting 
countries with stronger currencies to buy commodities at cheaper prices and a weaker 
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currency means that developing countries now pay a higher price when buying things 
from the global market. Requiring countries to remove tariffs or reduce taxes on 
imported goods allows foreign corporations to enter a developing country to sell their 
products and often end up taking over the market. Those are just a few examples of 
how IMF and World Bank conditionalities can be detrimental to the economy of a 
developing country.  
 
4 United States and sub-Saharan Africa trade 
The U.S has lost a considerable amount of influence in Africa, and this can be 
attributed by the mere fact that over the decade, competition for influence in Africa has 
been high, especially from China. The current administration does not seem very much 
interested in Africa and perhaps does not see it as a strategic point now. Trump has 
not made it a priority to visit any African country to date. The U.S presidents before him 
have made numerous trips to Africa. George W Bush has visited Africa 11 times, Bill 
Clinton 10 times and Barack Obama made 9 visits to the continent (Dahir, 2018). While 
there is still time for Trump to make that visit, his counterpart Xi Jinping of China has so 
far, since he was made president in 2013, visited Africa at the beginning of each 
year (Lijadu, 2018). Then there were reports that came out in 2018 where Trump was 
alleged to have called Haiti and African countries “shithole countries”. It was alleged 
that the remarks were made in a meeting where Trump was complaining about 
immigration of people coming from Africa and argued that the U.S needs more people 
from countries like Norway (Schneider, 2018). The president himself has never denied 
these claims. 
 
In terms of trade, US goods exported to sub Saharan- Africa amounted to $15,8 billion 
with imports at $25,1 billion, creating a trade deficit of $9,2 billion (Africa | United States 
Trade Representative, 2019). Trade between sub-Saharan Africa and the United 
States sharply declined subsequent to the financial crises of 2008. Figure 5 below 
shows that after 2009, China officially became sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest trading 
partner. Calculations show that in 2000 U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa amounted 
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to about $30.6 billion and in 2008 it stood at around $107.3 billion. Since then it has 
declined to $52.8 billion in 2014(Wioletta Nowak, 2017) and as of 2018, that amount 
stood at $40,9 billion ((Africa | United States Trade Representative, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 5: Trade comparison between 3 countries 
 
4.1.1 African Growth and Opportunity Act 
The African Growth and Opportunity act (AGOA) is a U.S economic and engagement 
policy with Africa. It was enacted in 2000 for a period of 8 years and has been 
extended 4 times, and the current extension ends in 2025. AGOA allows qualifying 
sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to U.S markets for over 1800 products. 
To meet AGOA’s rigorous eligibility requirements, countries must establish or make 
continual progress toward establishing a market-based economy, the rule of law, 
political pluralism, and the right to due process.  Additionally, countries must eliminate 
barriers to U.S. trade and investment, enact policies to reduce poverty, combat 
corruption and protect human rights. 
4.1.2 Trump administration strategy for Africa 
On December 13, 2018, Trump Administration National Security Advisor John Bolton 
held a press conference at the Heritage foundation, Washington, D.C where he 
outlined the new Africa Strategy for the current U.S administration. A lot of the talking 
was centred around China’s engagements in Africa, and there was a lot of criticism 
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towards China. In fact, the name China was mentioned 14 times in that speech. The 
main accusation against China, he claims, is its “debt trap diplomacy” that it is 
practicing in Africa, and John Bolton took the opportunity to warn African leaders 
against falling into this trap. He claims that China is monopolising natural resources all 
over the world and the One Belt One Road initiative, a project that is going to be 
operational over decades, is going to need a lot of resources and for this reason China 
will use Africa.  
Apart from warning African leaders of China’s debt diplomacy, he also spent a 
considerable amount of time talking about Russia and how it is also engaging in 
predatory practices on the continent. John Bolton accused both countries of inhibiting 
investment opportunities for the U.S. Furthermore, he claims that U.S military 
operations on the continent are also being threatened and that is a direct threat to U.S 
national security as there are still several terrorist groups on the continent that are 
planning to harm the U.S. Bolton made the example of China building a military base in 
Djibouti. The base in question is not far from the already existing U.S base, and Bolton 
feels that it interferes with the U.S operation to counter violent terrorist organizations in 
East Africa (John Bolton Unveils Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy, 2018).   
Some of the main priorities the U.S has for the new strategy include; 
• Advancing trade and strengthening ties so that Africa can prosper. 
• Dealing with terrorism to combat plots against harming Americans and for 
African countries to contain terrorism. 
• Cutting back on funding unsuccessful peace keeping operations. 
• Advancing rule of law on the continent. 
• No foreign aid for corrupt governments. 
John Bolton argues that U.S has donated a lot of humanitarian aid to Africa over the 
last two decades. In fact, this amounts to more than all other donors put together. in 
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2017, $8.7 billion was donated and a similar sum the previous year. The time of 
wasting money was over and now it will be based on results.  
The message was made clear that the new Africa strategy is to help African countries 
and that they should reject China and Russia. However, it did not always feel like that 
while listening to the speech, considering a lot of it was about protecting U.S interests 
on the continent. Talking about China and Russia is an indication that even though the 
strategy was about Africa, it may have really been about China and Russia as the two 
countries are both a threat to U.S political power and influence. While China’s main 
stance is providing funding for developmental purposes without conditions, the U.S. 
has requirements with respect to who gets funding. Additionally, it is moving from an 
aid giving relationship to one that will be more concentrated on development and 
investments in business. It is a clear indication that the U.S has learned from China on 
what African leaders are looking for. People on the continent feel like they have not 
benefited from aid, as humanitarian aid and military operations have nothing to show 
for them as the continent still has problems with poverty and terrorism.  
The new strategy was received with mixed feelings. Liberian former minister of public 
work, Gyude Moore, claims that the new strategy is a step in the right direction, but the 
lack of political star power was insulting. She added that the U.S is not doing enough, 
and it did not even have the decency, the courtesy to send a high-ranking official to the 
event (Paquette, 2019).  
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5 Conclusion 
Since China’s economic reform and its joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, it 
has emerged from being a poor country to becoming the second biggest economy in 
the world after the U.S. They are each other’s biggest trading partners with a combined 
$737.1 billion in goods and services moving between the two countries. However, they 
are also competing for global influence and their relationship has been shaky lately with 
the United States accusing China of unfair trade practices. For a long time, the U.S and 
Western countries were sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest trading partners, but over the last 
two decades China made a lot of commitment to investing in Africa and officially 
became its biggest trading partner in 2009. It is increasingly becoming apparent that for 
the U.S, sub-Saharan Africa is not seen as an important partner when comparing how 
much China is involved in Africa. Still, the U.S is reminding African countries that it is 
still committed to helping Africa to develop and to be self-reliant. The current Trump 
administration has committed to invest more in Africa, but the message seems more   
centred to curbing China’s influence on the continent, rather than to trying to help 
Africa.  
Sub-Saharan Africa lacks a lot infrastructure to stimulate intra-continental trade 
between the nations in the region, and its partnership with China provides a chance to 
meet this demand for infrastructure as China has offered to fund a lot of projects in 
Africa as part of the One Belt One Road initiative that covers 3 continents, and which 
aims to connect China to the rest of the world by controlling supply chain and 
increasing global influence in the process. The OBOR initiative will bring some much-
needed development in sub-Saharan Africa but it comes with many challenges and 
problems. An example of these concerns the railway built in Kenya. The project was 
costly and needed the Kenyan government to take out loans from a Chinese bank. 
Furthermore, the railway was built using Chinese labour, machinery and industrial 
commodities such as cement. The railway is currently not generating enough revenue 
that can be used to pay back the loan. This is not an isolated case and it is increasingly 
becoming more common in Africa.  
African countries keep echoing that China is an equal partner that respects African 
traditions and way of doing things. As for China, it is happy to repeat that sentiment as 
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president Xi Jinping proudly announced a further $60 billion in funding for African 
countries at the 2018 Africa-China summit. While many can criticize China’s 
engagement in Africa as debt trap diplomacy that aims to extract as much resources 
from Africa by inviting African governments to take out unsustainable loans, it is difficult 
to make an argument that traditional lenders like IMF and World Bank are any better. 
As a matter of fact, the IMF and World Bank have also been accused of practicing 
similar things and are often accused of being tools of big western countries. The IMF 
provides short them debt to developing countries at almost no interest. This is very 
inviting and it seems logical to take up the offers, but the difference between IMF and 
World Bank loans and Chinese loans is the conditionalities that come with the IMF’s 
and World Bank’s loans. As previously stated, China claims that its loans come with no 
conditions, while IMF makes it clear that for borrowing countries, they must agree to 
IMF conditionalities that are claimed to help countries get out of the economic slump 
that they found themselves in and to help them pay back the loans. However, they 
have been accused of making things worse and making it easier for Western 
corporations to come into developing countries. The idea of interfering in internal 
matters of a country is not something that many African leaders want.  African leaders 
are however not blind to Chinese loans and fully understand what is at stake, and they 
are urging each other to use loans for good use and to take blame when they are 
unable to pay back loans. 
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